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Abstract 
Utilising four annual panel datasets and dynamic panel data estimation procedures we find that 
trade and financial openness, as well as economic institutions are statistically important 
determinants of the variation in financial development across countries and over time since the 
1980s. However, we find mixed support for the hypothesis that the simultaneous opening of both 
trade and capital accounts is necessary to promote financial development in a contemporary setting.  
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1.  Introduction   
It is now widely accepted that financial development constitutes a potentially important mechanism 
for long run growth (Levine, 2003; Demetriades and Andrianova 2004; Demetriades and Hussein, 
1996; Goodhart, 2004).
1  The frontier of the literature in this field is, therefore, shifting towards 
providing answers to the question of why some countries are more financially developed than 
others.  Four influential hypotheses have emerged in recent literature, which directly or indirectly 
are able to provide plausible answers to this question. These are (i) the endowment hypothesis; (ii) 
the law and finance hypothesis; (iii) the simultaneous openness hypothesis; (iv) the economic 
institutions hypothesis.  Briefly, the essential ingredients of each of the three hypotheses are as 
follows:
2  
(i) The endowment hypothesis introduced by Acemoglu et al (2001) acknowledges the importance 
of strong institutions for financial development and argues that institutional quality varies across 
countries because of varying initial endowments. In simple terms, this hypothesis suggests that the 
disease environment encountered by European colonising powers in past centuries – proxied in 
empirical studies by settler mortality - was a major retarding factor for the establishment of 
institutions that would promote long run prosperity.  Thus, it is argued that European colonial 
powers established extractive institutions that are unsuitable for long-term growth where the 
environment was unfavourable and institutions that were better suited for growth where they 
encountered favourable environments.  
(ii) The law and finance hypothesis due to La Porta et al (1997) puts forward the idea that common 
law based systems, originating from English law, are better suited than civil law based systems, 
primarily rooted in French law, for the development of capital markets.  This is because English law 
evolved to protect private property from the crown while French law was developed with the aim of 
addressing corruption of the judiciary and enhancing the powers of the state.  Over time this meant 
that legal systems originating from English law protected small investors a lot better than systems 
                                                 
1 Other fundamental mechanisms of growth include economic institutions, such as property rights. Claessens and Laeven (2003), for 
example, provide firm level evidence which suggests that the effect of better property rights on growth is as large as the effect of 
improved access to financing due to greater financial development.   It has also been argued that where property rights are weak, 
financial development may not be sufficient to promote growth.  Weak property rights may discourage investment even when bank 
loans are available (see Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002).     
2
 These hypotheses may contain some common elements. We introduce them separately to clarify the exposition.  
 
  2which evolved from French law.  Consequently, it is argued that capital markets developed faster in 
countries with common law systems than in those with civil law systems.
3   
(iii) The openness hypothesis put forward by Rajan and Zingales (2003), postulates that interest 
groups, specifically industrial and financial incumbents, frequently stand to lose from financial 
development, because it usually breeds competition, which erodes their rents.  They argue that 
incumbents’ opposition will be weaker when an economy is open to both trade and capital flows, 
hence the opening of both the trade and capital accounts holds the key to successful financial 
development.  This is not only because trade and financial openness limit the ability of incumbents 
to block the development of financial markets but also because the new opportunities created by 
openness may generate sufficient new profits for them that outweigh the negative effects of 
increased competition.  
(iv) The economic institutions hypothesis recently put forward by Acemoglu et al (2004), which 
builds on the endowment hypothesis, proposes a dynamic political economy framework in which 
economic differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic 
development.  Economic institutions, which determine the incentives and constraints of economic 
agents, are social decisions that are chosen for their consequences.  Political institutions and income 
distribution are the dynamic forces that combine to shape economic institutions and outcomes.  It is 
argued that growth promoting economic institutions emerge when political institutions (a) allocate 
power to groups with interests in broad based property rights enforcement, (b) create effective 
constraints on power holders and when there are few rents to be captured by power holders.     
The first two hypotheses, by emphasising historical factors that are time invariant can, at best, only 
explain some of the cross-country variation in financial development.
4 The third and fourth 
hypotheses could go some way in explaining both the cross-country and the time series variation in 
financial development, since they are both dynamical in nature, in that they emphasize factors that 
may be changing over time.  Even though both these hypotheses acknowledge the importance of 
political elites, they nevertheless emphasize distinct mechanisms of financial development.  The 
third hypothesis emphasizes the importance of simultaneous current account and capital account 
                                                 
3 Beck et al (2003a) provide evidence which suggests that both these two hypotheses have some merit in explaining cross-country 
variations in financial development but find more evidence in favour of the endowments one.   
4 These hypotheses cannot be tested using panel data fixed effects or first differenced models, since the factors that they emphasise 
are time invariant and are either spanned by the country dummies or are differenced away and cannot be identified.    
  3openness and as such also has clear contemporary policy implications.
5 The fourth hypothesis 
suggests that even though complex political mechanisms may be at work (including social conflict 
emanating from changing political forces such as the rise of mass democracy and the changes in the 
distribution of income), economic institutions are the main mechanism that helps to shape economic 
development at any point in time. 
The importance of understanding the factors behind the time series variation in financial 
development, alongside those that shape the cross-country variation, cannot be overemphasised.  
Consider, for example, the case of South Korea, a well known success story in terms of financial 
and economic development.  During 1960-2004, South Korea's ratio of private credit to GDP rose 
from 12.29 (per cent of GDP) to 98.21 (per cent of GDP), representing an eight-fold increase in one 
of the most important indicators of financial development in less than half a century.
6   T h i s  
massive leap forward constitutes a significant closing of the gap between South Korea and the 15 
high income OECD countries, whose private credit to GDP ratio climbed from 66 per cent of GDP 
in 1960 to 185 per cent of GDP in 2004.  Thus, South Korea's credit to GDP ratio rose from 18% of 
the average of the world leaders in 1960 to 53% by 2004.
7 While it may be argued that Korea’s 
spectacular financial development is exceptional, examining the norm suggests that the time series 
variation in financial development over the same period has been quite substantial: the worldwide 
average of private credit to GDP increased by 54% during the same period.  This figure masks wide 
regional variation from 435% in South Asia to 165% in North Africa-Middle East and 37% in the 
Latin American-Caribbean region. 
Given the importance of the time-series variation in financial development in modern times, an 
empirical investigation into its determinants must be able to account for its variation both across 
countries and over time. We therefore utilise panel data techniques and annual data to shed light on 
the determinants of financial development in these two dimensions.  The specification of our 
empirical model is informed by the third and fourth hypotheses, both of which acknowledge the 
role of political economy factors but emphasize different mechanisms of (financial and economic) 
development.     
                                                 
5 Interestingly these implications are not consistent with the sequencing literature, which advocates that trade liberalisation should 
precede financial liberalisation and that capital account opening should be the last stage in the liberalisation process (e.g. McKinnon, 
1991). 
6 All the data quoted in this section are obtained from World Development Indicators 2005. 
7 Neither the legal origin nor the endowment hypothesis, both of which focus on pre-determined historical factors, can explain cases 
such as South Korea.  Interestingly, South Korea’s legal tradition is based on civil law traditions, via Japan and Germany. 
  4While it is highly plausible – indeed almost tautological - that political economy factors have a key 
influence in shaping policies and institutions that affect the development of financial markets, 
providing empirical evidence that tests the two hypotheses directly is not straightforward.  For a 
start, appropriate political economy measures of the interests and power of elites are not directly 
observable.
8 Observable political variables, such as political system or political orientation, are too 
crude to capture the intrigues that help to shape policies and institutions that affect financial 
development.
9  Thus, the best that can be established empirically is whether the evidence is 
consistent with the economic implications of the two hypotheses by using the (reduced form) 
mechanisms suggested by Rajan and Zingales (2003) – trade and financial openness - and 
Acemoglu et al (2004) – economic institutions.  To this end, this paper examines the following two 
hypotheses utilising annual panel data and appropriate estimation methods:  
I.  Does the simultaneous opening of both trade and capital accounts promote financial 
development?  
II.  Do economic institutions have a positive influence on financial development over and above 
trade and financial openness? 
The first hypothesis requires both trade and financial openness to be statistically significant 
determinants of financial development.  A stricter interpretation of RZ needs to provide a test of the 
prediction that the opening of both trade and capital accounts is a necessary condition for successful 
financial development. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that trade openness without financial 
openness is likely to result in greater financial repression of new firms as well as loan subsidies, so 
that industrial incumbents have sufficient cheap finance to face competition.  They also argue that 
the financial openness alone will allow the largest domestic firms to tap foreign funds – which they 
may not actually need – but will not allow small or potential domestic firms access to funds.  The 
domestic financial sector may see its profits threatened since industrial incumbents have access to 
international finance and may therefore push for liberalising access. However, it will face 
opposition by industrial incumbents who will continue to oppose financial development in order to 
prevent competition.  Thus, “…cross border capital flows alone are unlikely to convince both our 
interest groups to push for financial development.”(Rajan and Zingales 2003, p.22).  Hence, the 
                                                 
8 Kauffman and Vicente (2005) have recently produced an indicator of ‘corporate legal corruption’ for 2004, which would have been 
well suited for our purpose had it been available longitudinally.   
9 Abiad and Mody (2005) find that political factors are not statistically significant determinants of the probability of financial 
reforms. 
  5strict interpretation of RZ should also provide a test of the following two hypotheses, which can be 
considered as elaborations of Hypothesis I:  
a.  Trade openness without financial openness does not promote financial development.  
b.  Financial openness without trade openness does not promote financial development.   
Our empirical strategy aims to provide evidence on both the loose and strict interpretations of RZ. 
We elaborate on this in Section 2. 
Hypothesis II, while not inconsistent with RZ, is much closer to the core of the Acemoglu et al 
(2004) thesis which postulates that economic institutions are the fundamental cause of long run 
growth.
10 Indeed, Rajan and Zingales recognise the importance of economic institutions, such as 
respect for property rights, accounting and disclosure standards, contract enforcement and 
regulation.  However, they see these institutions as a mechanism driven by political economy 
factors, which are ultimately shaped by trade and financial openness.  Since trade and financial 
openness variables are the ultimate determinants of financial development in RZ, including 
institutions alongside openness in the same equation is like including the same variable twice (i.e. 
double counting).  This may lead to multicollinearity which may take away from the statistical 
significance of the openness variables. Thus, a pure test of RZ needs to exclude economic 
institutions from the conditioning set.
11  
The empirical evidence on the two hypotheses of interest remains relatively thin, in spite of several 
important recent contributions.  The sample of countries and the period used by Rajan and Zingales 
was dictated by their desire to explain reversals in financial development through a historical 
perspective, covering the period 1913-1999. Notwithstanding the importance and contribution of 
their empirical exercise, their cross-country snapshots at specific points in time do not utilise the 
time dimension to explain the variation of financial development over time.  Chinn and Ito (2006), 
on the other hand, do take advantage of some of the time series variation in available data by 
making use a panel of 108 countries during 1980-2000 and examine questions similar to ours, 
                                                 
10Many other authors have emphasised the importance of institutions for economic growth and the development of financial markets 
(e.g. North and Weingast, 1989; Arestis and Demetriades,  1997; Demetriades and Andrianova, 2004).  
11 Even if economic institutions are found to be important for financial development (and economic growth) it does not necessarily 
follow that elites have a decisive influence on whether such institutions are adopted.  The political economy factors at play may 
reflect much wider considerations than the interests of industrial and financial incumbents.  For example, they may include the ability 
of the Breton Woods institutions to instigate institutional reform or introduce policy reform. Importantly, they may also reflect the 
political desire of a country to be admitted in prestigious ‘clubs’ like the OECD or the European Union, such as Korea in the 1990s.  
 
  6focussing on the links between capital account liberalization, and equity market development.
12 
However, they utilise five year panels by averaging out annual observations over five-year non-
overlapping periods. This inevitably results in an 80 per cent reduction in the number of 
observations that are used for estimation, as well as loss of potentially useful information provided 
by the time series variation, both of which may impair the identification of the parameters of 
interest.
13 Moreover, Chinn and Ito employ their own index of capital account liberalization (Chinn 
and Ito, 2002), defined as the first principal component of four binary measures of capital 
controls.
14 They interact this index with a measure of legal and institutional development, which 
further compounds the interpretation problem. Their main finding is that capital account 
liberalization spurs equity market development only if a threshold level of legal development has 
been attained. They do not, however, test the simultaneous openness hypothesis, which is one of the 
two primary objectives of this paper.  Moreover, their main focus is equity market development, 
while we largely focus on banking system development, not least because we aim to provide policy 
implications for the least financially developed economies.
 15 
16
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the empirical strategy, which encompasses 
specifying an appropriate dynamic model and estimation method.  Section 3 describes the various 
data sets that are utilised in the estimations of the model.  Section 4 reports and discusses the 
econometric results and makes comparisons to related literature, where appropriate.  Section 5 
                                                 
12 However, Chinn and Ito’s choice of estimator casts doubt on the robustness of their results.  Specifically, they use OLS without 
controlling for country fixed effects. If the omitted country specific effects - such as legal origin, geographical factors, ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation - are correlated with the right hand side regressors, which include per capita income, trade openness and 
the lagged level of financial development, then their estimates would be biased and inconsistent.   Thus, their findings should be 
treated with a fair degree of caution. 
13 Indeed most of the estimated coefficients in their tables are statistically insignificant. 
14 Principal component analysis is a purely statistical transformation of collinear economic variables into a set of uncorrelated 
variables – the principal components.  However, the transformed variables have no meaningful economic interpretation.  Moreover, 
the first principal component accounts for only a fraction of the variation of the underlying economic variables; the variation that is 
not accounted for may result in omitted variable bias.  
15 At early stages of development, banking system development is perhaps the only feasible type of financial development that can 
be considered.  Chinn and Ito (2006) themselves find that banking system development is a precondition for equity market 
development.   
16 Other authors have examined related questions but no one has directly examined both hypotheses investigated by this paper.
 Beck 
(2003) shows that countries with better-developed financial systems have higher shares of manufactured exports in GDP and in total 
merchandise exports. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) find that there is a positive interdependence between financial development and 
liberal trade policies. Levine (2001) finds that liberalising restrictions on international portfolio flows tends to enhance stock market 
liquidity, and allowing greater foreign bank presence tends to enhance the efficiency of the domestic banking system. Klein and 
Olivei (1999) show that capital account liberalisation has a substantial impact on growth via the deepening of a country’s financial 
system in highly industrialised countries, but find little evidence of financial liberalisation promoting financial development outside 
the OECD. Huang and Temple (2005) focus on the relationship between financial development and trade openness, but do not take 
into account capital account openness and institutions. There is also a large micro-literature investigating peripheral questions such as 
the impact of foreign bank entry on domestic banks (Claessens et al, 2001), the effects of stock market liberalization on equity prices 
(Henry, 2000), the impact of capital account liberalization on economic growth (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2001).  
  7draws out the policy implications of our estimates by calculating and commenting on the marginal 
effects of openness and institutions.  Finally, Section 6 summarises and concludes.  
  
2.  Empirical Strategy  
A Dynamic Empirical Model 
Our empirical specification is aimed at explaining the variation in financial development across 
countries and over time by utilising an empirical model that allows the testing of the two 
hypotheses of interest.  Given this aim, our empirical strategy endeavours to make maximum use of 
both the time and cross-country dimensions of available data sets, which dictates using data at an 
annual frequency in the estimation.
17   Using annual data for estimation purposes necessitates 
making an allowance for the possibility that the annual observations on financial development may 
not represent long run equilibrium values in any given year, because of slow adjustment to changes 
in other variables.
18  To allow for the possibility of partial adjustment, we specify a dynamic log-
linear equation for financial development which includes a lagged dependent variable.  Our 
empirical model is therefore as follows:  
 
ln FDit = β0 + γ ln FDit-1 + β1 ln Yit-1 + β2 ln TOit-1 + β3 ln FO it-1 + β4 ln INSit-1 +  
  +   β5 {ln FOit-1 x lnTOit-1} + uit        (1) 
 
where FD is an indicator of financial development, Y is per capita income, TO is trade openness, 
FO is financial openness, INS is economic institutions and u is an error term that contains country 
and time specific fixed effects: 
 u it = μi + εt +ν it
                                                 
17 Our empirical strategy differs from much of the empirical growth literature, which typically averages out data over five or ten year 
horizons, which is aimed at capturing the steady state relationship between the variables on hand.  However, averaging out need not 
always capture the steady state equilibrium while the smoothing out of time series data removes useful variation from the data, which 
may result in imprecise estimates. 
18Indicators that are asset based such as liquid liabilities, which measures the size of the banking system relative to GDP, are likely to 
display persistence: the size of the banking system this year has much to do with the size of the banking system in previous years.  A 
similar argument can also be made for flow variables, such as bank credit. Even though it may be expected that the flow of credit can 
adjust more quickly to its equilibrium value than the stock of assets, the former also depends on its own history.  A bank’s customer 
base largely determines the demand for loans in a given year and that is not expected to fluctuate much from year to year.  The same 
is true of bank loan supply, because the latter depends on the bank’s scale of operations, proxied by the size of its balance sheet.  It is 
therefore plausible to argue that on a year to year basis, all financial development indicators exhibit persistence, and adjust in 
accordance to a partial adjustment mechanism. 
  8where the ν it are assumed to be independent and identically distributed with mean zero and variance 
σν
2.  
The right hand side regressors are lagged by one period in order to address possible simultaneity or 
reverse causality from financial development to any of the right hand side regressors. Importantly, 
for example, the finance and growth literature suggests that financial development may help to 
promote economic growth, which could mean that GDP per capita may be a function of either the 
current or past levels of financial development. Including the lagged value of GDP per capita 
addresses possible reverse causality, in so far as the ν it  are independent of each other and across 
time.  
Hypothesis Testing and Policy Implications  
Equation (1) includes the variables of interest for the two hypotheses that are being tested, 
alongside a lagged dependent variable intended to capture dynamics and the level of per capita 
income, intended as a control variable.  The equation postulates that financial development is 
determined by the variables of interest – trade and financial openness and economic institutions – 
alongside a set of conditioning variables, which include: the past history of financial development, 
summarised by the lagged dependent variable, the stage of economic development, captured by per 
capita income, and all time-invariant country specific factors, such as geography, climate, ethno-
linguistic characteristics etc.   
The interaction term between trade and financial openness is expected to shed light on the 
simultaneous openness hypothesis. At the margin, the total effect of increasing trade and/or 
financial openness can be calculated by examining the partial derivatives of financial development 
































β β          ( 3 )  
Hypothesis I is satisfied if the sum of the two derivatives is positive. A small increase in both trade 
and financial openness would then result in a positive impact on financial development. This is 
clearly satisfied if both the partial derivatives above are positive, in which case the simultaneous 
opening of both trade and capital accounts would have a larger impact on financial development 
than the opening of either.   
  9The strict version of RZ implies that the marginal effect of trade openness should be non-positive 
when an economy is financially closed.  It also implies that the marginal effect of financial 
openness should be non-positive when an economy is closed to trade.   These two predictions 
provide relatively straightforward tests of the strict version of RZ. We examine these questions by 
calculating the partial derivatives at the minimum levels of openness within our sample.  If it is the 
case that in the most closed economy-year, the marginal effects of trade and financial openness are 
positive, we can conclude that an important prediction of RZ does not hold.  On the other hand, if 
we find that the marginal effects at the minimum levels of openness to be non-positive, we conclude 
that there is some evidence in favour of RZ.  This test clearly errs on the side of being too generous 
to RZ.  A less generous definition of ‘closed’ would be the bottom decile or quartile.  A counter-
argument of being too generous to RZ is that we now live in an era of relative trade and financial 
openness, in which case even the minimum values of openness we observe in our sample, which is 
post-1980, do not represent closed economies. If this counter-argument is accepted, it is tantamount 
to accepting that RZ cannot explain financial under-development post 1980.   
A more persuasive caveat to our proposed test of the strict version of RZ is that if both partial 
derivatives are positive when an economy is closed, opening both the trade and capital accounts 
will have a larger impact on financial development than opening either.  Hence, ‘simultaneous’ 
opening could have a large positive impact on financial development, which is one of the other 
predictions of RZ.  Thus, one of the predictions of RZ may be refuted while another prediction may 
receive empirical support – a classic case of mixed evidence.    
Hypothesis II on the other hand appears much more straightforward. If β4  is positive and 
significant, it would be legitimate to conclude that improvements in economic institutions are likely 
to have a positive influence on financial development. However, to examine its policy implications, 
some additional calculations would be useful.   
The caveat on the interpretation of the estimated coefficients on the variables of interest is that to 
the extent that there is an overlap between the two hypotheses, it may impact on the statistical 
significance of the variables, resulting in erroneous conclusions.  For example, greater trade and 
financial openness, through political economy actions, may result in better economic institutions, 
i.e. institutions may be the channel that captures some, if not all, the effects of openness.  Thus, 
including both sets of variables in the empirical model may result in insignificant coefficients 
throughout because of over-parameterisation or just for the openness variables. For this reason, we 
  10estimate models with and without the institutions variable, which allows us to have a purer test of 
the openness hypothesis. 
A final comment that needs to be made on the interpretation of the estimated coefficients is that the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable in the model means that all the estimated beta 
coefficients represent short-run effects. The long-run effects can be derived by dividing each of the 
betas by 1- γ, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.   
Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the empirical model implies that there is 
correlation between the regressors and the error term since lagged financial development depends 
on uit-1 which is a function of the μi - the country fixed effects.  Because of this correlation, dynamic 
panel data estimation of equation (1) suffers from the Nickell (1981) bias, which disappears only if 
T tends to infinity. The preferred estimator in this case is GMM suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), which basically differences the model to get rid of country specific effects or any time 
invariant country specific variable. This also eliminates any endogeneity that may be due to the 
correlation of these country specific effects and the right hand side regressors.
19  
The moment conditions utilize the orthogonality conditions between the differenced errors and 
lagged values of the dependent variable. This assumes that the original disturbances in (1) – the ν it - 
are serially uncorrelated and that the differenced error is, therefore, MA(1) with unit root. To this 
end, two diagnostics are computed using the Arellano and Bond GMM procedure to test for first 
order and second order serial correlation in the disturbances. One should reject the null of the 
absence of first order serial correlation and not reject the absence of second order serial correlation.  
A special feature of dynamic panel data GMM estimation is that the number of moment conditions 
increase with T. Therefore, a Sargan test is performed to test the over-identification restrictions. 
There is convincing evidence that too many moment conditions introduce bias while increasing 
efficiency. It is, therefore, suggested that a subset of these moment conditions be used to take 
advantage of the trade-off between the reduction in bias and the loss in efficiency (See Baltagi, 
2005, and the references cited there). For example, for the data set used in Table 2 with N=42 
countries and T=22, we restrict the moment conditions to a maximum of two lags on the dependent 
variable. This yields a Sargan statistic that is asymptotically distributed as Chi-squared with 42 
                                                 
19 An additional advantage of the GMM estimator is that by differencing it helps to ensure that all the regressors are stationary. 
 
  11degrees of freedom, i.e., 42 over-identification restrictions. On the other hand for the data set 
underlying Table 3 with N=31 countries and T=7, using all the moment conditions implied by the 
Arellano and Bond GMM procedure yields 13 over-identification restrictions. 
 
3.  Data and Sources  
We utilise four data sets to estimate equation 1, corresponding to two different measures of 
financial openness and two sets of financial development indicators.  This section outlines the data 
and estimation methods.  
The first measure of financial openness is the financial globalization indicator constructed by Lane 
and Milesi-Feretti (2006), which we collect for 42 developing countries during 1980-2003. This 
indicator is defined as the volume of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities (% of GDP).  At any 
given point in time, this measure provides a useful summary of a country’s history of financial 
openness, which for our purposes is an advantage over flow-based measures like the WDI measure 
of gross private capital flows, which place all the emphasis on the current observation.
20  This is 
because the political economy factors which we are trying to capture with this measure, such as the 
power of financial incumbents, are unlikely to display as much variability as private capital flows.   
The second measure of financial openness is the financial liberalization measure constructed by 
Abiad and Mody (2005), which is available annually for a group of 34 developed and developing 
countries for the period 1980-1996.  This is an excellent measure of financial liberalization, in that 
it captures six different aspects of liberalization, comprising credit controls, interest rate controls, 
entry barriers, regulations, privatisation, and international transactions.  It has a much wider range 
than most other indicators of financial liberalization – from 0 to 18 – which is extremely useful for 
estimation purposes.  Its main disadvantage is that it may be too broad for our specific purpose: 
‘international transactions’ is just one of the six aspects of financial liberalization.  However, it 
could be argued that even domestic financial liberalization contributes to financial openness; for 
example, removing entry barriers and regulations may create more competition for financial 
incumbents, even if it is from within.  Moreover, the broadness of the indicator needs to be counter-
balanced against its wide range: capital account liberalization indicators are usually little more than 
dummies taking the values 0 or 1.    
                                                 
20 In an earlier version of the paper we did use the WDI measure of gross capital flows.  The results were qualitatively not dissimilar 
even though, were somewhat less satisfactory in terms of diagnostics and significance of the interaction term.  
  12The first set of financial development indicators contains three standard banking development 
indicators, namely liquid liabilities, private credit and domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector (all as % of GDP).  The second set consists of one capital market development indicator, 
namely number of companies listed (% of population in million).  The source for the latter, which is 
available annually for a shorter period than the banking indicators, is World Development 
Indicators.  Clearly, each of these indicators captures a different aspect of financial development 
and has its own strengths and weaknesses.  Among the banking indicators, Private Credit is 
probably the most relevant to measure opportunities for new firms, or as Rajan and Zingales put it 
“the ease with which any entrepreneur or company with a sound project can obtain finance” (p. 9). 
Liquid Liabilities measures the ability of banks to mobilise funds or the size of the banking system 
relative to the economy, but the funds are not always used to finance new entrepreneurs, so this is 
not as good an indicator of financial development in the RZ sense. Domestic Credit comprises 
private credit as well as credit to the public sector, thus it is probably the least well suited to capture 
financial development in the RZ sense. Among stock market indicators, Number of companies listed 
is arguably the one that is closest to the RZ hypothesis, in that it reflects the degree of access to the 
capital market by new companies.
21  
Annual data on real GDP per capita, converted to US dollars based on 2000 constant prices, is also 
from the World Development Indicators. Trade openness is measured by the ratio of total trade to 
GDP, also from World Development Indicators. Institutional quality data is from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – a monthly publication of Political Risk Services (PRS). Following 
Knack and Keefer (1995), five PRS indicators are used to measure economic institutions, namely: 
(i) Corruption (ii) Rule of Law (iii) Bureaucratic Quality (iv) Government Repudiation of Contracts 
and (v) Risk of Expropriation; higher values of these indicators - the first three of which are scaled 
from 0 to 6 and the other two from 0 to 10 - imply better institutional quality.  Since all these 
aspects of the institutional environment are likely to be relevant for the security of property rights, 
                                                 
21 In earlier versions of the paper we also used other stock market development indicators, such as turnover, value 
traded and market capitalisation.  However, these indicators are susceptible to measurement error due to differences in 
international definitions, excess volatility and possible unit roots in stock prices. Because of this, the results were less 
satisfactory. The openness terms were not significant in the liquidity equations, while the lagged dependent variable in 
the stock market capitalisation equations was statistically close to unity suggesting the presence of a unit root (which 
accords well with the random walk in stock prices hypothesis).      
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scaling).
22 Thus, the theoretical range of this index is 0 to 50.   
The four data sets are summarised in Tables 1a-1d; 1a and 1b correspond to the datasets underlying 
the results in Table 2 while 1c and 1d correspond to the data sets used in the regressions reported in 
Table 3.  Tables 1a-1d provide the definition and source of each variable, its unit of measurement 
and summary statistics, the sample period and countries for which these variables are collected.  In 
addition, the correlations matrix between the variables in each of the data sets is also provided.  It 
can be seen that all the variables, including the institutions index, display considerable variation 
both between and within countries, justifying the use of panel estimation techniques.  Moreover, the 
correlations coefficients between the various financial development indicators are positive, as 
would be expected.  The correlation coefficient between trade openness and financial globalization 
is 0.48 in Dataset 1 and 0.67 in Dataset 2.  The correlation between trade openness and financial 
liberalization is also positive but much lower: 0.22 in Dataset 3 and 0.18 in Dataset 4.  The 
correlation coefficient between institutional quality and trade openness is 0.36, 0.30, 0.03 and -0.01 
in Datasets 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.  The correlation coefficient between institutional quality and 
financial globalization is 0.21 in Dataset 1 and 0.08 in Dataset 2.   The correlation coefficient 
between institutional quality and financial liberalization, however, is much higher: 0.62 in Dataset 3 
and 0.58 in Dataset 4.  Finally, the correlation coefficient between real GDP per capita and the other 
regressors ranges between 0.03 (with financial globalization in Dataset 1) and 0.70 (with 
institutional quality in Dataset 3).  Thus, the summary statistics allow us to conclude that there is a 
reasonable degree of independent variation in the data, which should allow the identification of the 
various parameters of interest.  
 
4. Empirical  Results   
This section reports the results of estimating Equation (1) on the four data sets using Dynamic 
GMM estimation and their implications for the hypotheses of interest.  It also reports the results of a 




                                                 
22 The scale of corruption, bureaucratic quality and rule of law was first converted to 0 to 10 (multiplying them by 5/3) 
to make them comparable to the other indicators.   
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developing/emerging country data sets, which utilise the financial globalization measure to proxy 
financial openness.  Table 3 reports the results using the two developed & developing countries 
datasets, which utilize the financial liberalization measure to proxy financial openness. All the 
diagnostics in both tables are satisfactory in all cases.  Specifically, the Sargan test does not reject 
the over-identification restrictions, the absence of first order serial correlation is rejected and the 
absence of second order serial correlation is not rejected.  Moreover, all the lagged dependent 
variables in all cases are positive and significant, with coefficients that are significantly below 
unity, ruling out explosive behaviour.  We therefore conclude that our choice of Dynamic GMM as 
the preferred panel estimator is confirmed by the data, suggesting that our estimates have good 
statistical properties.  We now turn to discuss the estimates in some detail, with particular emphasis 
the evidence they provide for the hypotheses of interest. 
Starting from the models explaining the banking indicators in Table 2, we can observe that real 
GDP per capita enters with a positive and significant coefficient throughout, suggesting that 
economic development has a positive impact on financial development, as expected.  In all six 
cases, both openness terms enter with positive and highly significant coefficients, while the 
interaction between trade and financial openness is negative and also highly significant.  Economic 
institutions enter with positive and highly significant coefficients in the Private Credit and 
Domestic Credit equations but are not significant in the Liquid Liabilities equation.  In Model 4, 
which explains the Number of Listed Companies, real GDP is positive but not significant.  Both 
openness terms enter with positive and highly significant coefficients while the interaction term 
enters with a negative and significant coefficient.  Economic institutions enter with a small negative 
coefficient that is statistically insignificant.  Throughout Table 2 all the estimated coefficients have 
plausible values, suggesting that the equations are well behaved.   
In Table 3, we can observe that real GDP per capita enters with a positive coefficient throughout all 
the models, even though it is smaller in magnitude in the Listed Companies regression than in the 
regressions explaining the banking indicators.  However, the number of openness terms that are 
significant in Table 3 is less than those in Table 2.  Specifically, trade openness is not significant in 
Model 5a and Models 6 and 7, but is significant in Models 8 and 5b.  Financial liberalization enters 
with a positive and highly significant coefficient in Models 5, 7 and 8.  It also enters with a positive 
but insignificant coefficient in Model 6.  The interaction term is negative and significant in 5 out of 
  158 cases, albeit with relatively small coefficients.  Economic institutions enter with positive and 
significant coefficient in all the banking development equations and a negative and significant 
coefficient in the Number of Listed Companies regression.  The latter may well reflect the 
possibility that better institutions are also associated with higher costs in setting up companies – i.e. 
more red tape. 
The broad conclusion we draw from Table 3, is that the coefficient of trade openness is significant 
only for the Number of Listed Companies, while the coefficient of financial liberalization is a 
significant determinant of financial development, in so far as this is measured by credit indicators 
and the number of listed companies.  Interestingly, trade openness is positive and significant in 
Model 5(b) which excludes institutions.  The evidence here therefore suggests that there may be an 
overlap between trade openness and institutions, suggesting that openness may indeed be working 
through institutions in this particular case.  However, this is the only case for which we have 
evidence that there may be an overlap between the two hypotheses of interest – in all the other cases 
excluding institutions from the equation makes no qualitative difference to the results. This is true 
in both Tables 2 and 3. 
Robustness Checks  
A variety of robustness checks were carried out to examine the sensitivity of the results to 
alternative estimation strategies.   
The first set of robustness checks involved using non-overlapping five year average data instead of 
annual data in the estimations.  Given the need to use first differences and lags in the estimation, 
this was only feasible for the first data set for which we have 24 annual observations. Even with this 
set, with the differencing and lagging, the number of time series observations declines to just 3.   
The results shown in Table 4 are similar to those in Table 2 in terms of sign and significance, but 
the magnitudes are different, as expected. Clearly the dynamics are now different, as would be 
expected by removing cyclical fluctuations.  The lagged dependent variable now enters with a much 
smaller coefficient than in the estimations using annual data, which remains, however, significant in 
the private credit and domestic credit regressions. Thus, both these equations were estimated by the 
Arellano-Bond method.  However, because the Arellano and Bond estimations revealed that the 
lagged dependent variable was not significant in the liquid liabilities regression, this equation was 
estimated by the fixed effects (within) estimator.  Table 4 therefore reports the estimation results of 
the latter, which is a more appropriate estimator in the absence of significant dynamics.   
  16The diagnostics of all the models presented in Table 4 are satisfactory, suggesting that the models 
are well specified and the estimators chosen are appropriate.  Lagged GDP is positive and highly 
significant in all models, suggesting that the level of economic development is an important 
determinant of the degree of banking development.  Both the openness terms and economic 
institutions are positive and significant in the private credit equation while the interaction term is 
negative and significant. While the coefficient estimates are higher compared to Model 1(a) which 
was estimated with annual data, the differences are much smaller when the implied long-run 
coefficients are calculated in both cases.   Importantly, the qualitative nature of the results remains 
unaltered in the case of the private credit regression. The results are somewhat weaker in the case of 
domestic credit and liquid liabilities. In particular, while GDP, institutions and trade openness enter 
with positive and significant coefficients at conventional levels, the significance of financial 
openness and the interaction term is weaker. The weakening of the results that is observed by using 
5-year non-overlapping average data is not surprising since the transformation of the annual data 
into five year non-overlapping averages, results in information loss.  
We have also carried out a large number of other robustness checks that are not reported in the 
tables due to space limitations.  These included using contemporaneous values of the regressors, 
using different estimators etc.  All these checks confirmed the robustness of our main results. Using 
contemporaneous values of the regressors simply results in higher values for the coefficients for the 
openness terms, which may reflect an upward bias due to reverse causality. The coefficient on GDP 
is, however, sensitive to this change: using the contemporaneous value of GDP in the estimations 
instead of the lagged value results in a negative coefficient for GDP, which may reflect business 
cycle and/or monetary policy considerations. When GDP is growing too rapidly, all other things 
equal, central banks tend to pull the brake, typically reflected in a slowing down of bank credit.  
Lagging GDP per capita while using contemporaneous values of the regressors returns a positive 
and significant coefficient on GDP, while the coefficients on the openness terms and economic 
institutions remain largely unchanged.  We also re-estimated some of the models using the fixed 
effects two stage least squares estimator, which is less efficient than the Arellano and Bond 
estimator.  These estimations resulted in very similar qualitative results as those reported here.  
Finally, we also used additional indicators of capital market development, such as stock market 
turnover, stock market liquidity and market capitalization. The results were weaker for the first two 
indicators; however, there are well known international comparability issues with these indicators 
(see Rajan and Zingales, 2003), which makes panel estimation inappropriate.   The results using 
  17stock market capitalization suggested explosive dynamics, with the coefficient in the lagged 
dependent variable being statistically not different to unity, making Arellano and Bond estimation 
inappropriate.  The latter may reflect the presence of a unit root in stock prices, since market 
capitalization reflects the movements of the stock market price index, which under weak form 
efficiency should evolve as a random walk.   
To conclude, the variety of robustness checks we carried out, confirm both the robustness of our 
empirical results as well as the appropriateness of the indicators used and our estimation strategy.  
Comparisons with earlier studies   
Our results, particularly those relating to the private credit indicator can be compared with those of 
Chinn and Ito (2006) who also use the same indicator.  However, some caution should be exercised 
in making such comparisons not least because the model specifications are not identical, the 
estimation procedures are not the same and the datasets and data frequencies used for estimation are 
different. Moreover, the Chinn and Ito indicator of financial openness – their own capital account 
liberalization index – is vastly different from the two indicators of financial openness that we 
utilize. Notwithstanding these important differences, it is still useful to carry out such a comparison, 
not least because it would help to clarify the extent of the current contribution in the context of 
related literature.  
In their private credit equation in Table 2.3, Chinn and Ito identify only two statistically significant 
determinants of private credit at the conventional 5% level, namely (i) their capital account 
liberalization index (ii) the lagged level of private credit.  Trade openness, per capita income, their 
institutional/legal variable and their interaction variable are all insignificant.  In their private credit 
equations reported in Table 2.4, which use four different legal indicators, but do not report the 
estimated parameters of the conditioning variables, none of the variables is shown to be statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  In sharp contrast, in both the private credit equations we report in 
Table 2 all the variables entered, including GDP per capita, trade openness, financial openness, and 
economic institutions appear with positive coefficients that are significant at the 1% level.   
Moreover, the interaction between financial and trade openness is also significant at the 1% level, 
with its negative coefficient indicating diminishing returns to openness to which we have alluded. 
These are, of course, important differences that we believe reflect the superiority of our empirical 
strategy, i.e. using annual data and the Arellano and Bond estimator. Indeed, the results do weaken 
somewhat in table 4 where we also use 5-year panels, suggesting that the use of annual data does 
  18make a difference in identifying the parameters more precisely.   However, even where we use 5-
year averages all the variables remain significant at conventional levels.  Hence the strength of the 
results must also reflect the choice of estimator, the differences between the financial openness 
indicators
23 used and, possibly, model specification.
24   
 
5. Hypotheses Testing and Policy Implications
25
This section provides evidence on the hypotheses of interest by calculating the marginal effects of 
openness and economic institutions. It also discusses the broader policy implications of our 
findings.  
Openness and Financial Development 
In order to shed light on RZ we evaluate the partial derivatives of each of the financial development 
indicators with respect to each type of openness using equations (2) and (3). Given that these 
derivatives vary within the sample depending on the level of financial or trade openness, 
respectively, we calculate them at the mean, minimum and maximum values of financial (trade) 
openness.  Because we have two specifications for each model, we utilize the specification that 
includes economic institutions if the latter variable is significant or the one that excludes institutions 
where it is found to be insignificant.
26   
The summary statistics of the derivatives of financial development indicators with respect to trade 
openness are presented in Table 5a.  Those with respect to financial openness are presented in Table 
5b.   
                                                 
23 In preliminary work we carried out for this paper we also used the Chinn and Ito indicator of capital account openness and found it 
to be statistically insignificant.  Chin and Ito find it significant in some of their regressions, particularly those that explain equity 
market development.   
24 The differences with Chinn and Ito (2006) are somewhat less striking when we compare their findings in Table 2.3 with the 
results we report in Table 3.  This is because when we control for institutions we too find trade openness to be insignificant.  
However, we continue to find income per capita and economic institutions correctly signed and significant and our interaction term, 
which has a negative sign, is also significant.  Moreover, trade openness does become significant when institutional quality is 
excluded.  Given the differences in the datasets used to produce the results in Tables 2 and 3, it may be argued that trade openness 
plays a much greater role in promoting financial development in developing countries than in developed ones.  When both types are 
included in the dataset the contribution of openness weakens.   
 
25 The discussion in this section – like any policy implications drawn from reduced form regressions - is subject to the usual caveat 
of the Lucas critique.  To the extent that this critique is valid, a reduced form relationship may well evaporate into thin air if the 
policy maker attempts to exploit it.  
26 The marginal effects of openness are larger if we use the models that exclude institutions.  A case can be made for using those 
models if it is accepted that improvements in economic institutions are mainly driven by increased openness.  However, the balance 
of the evidence in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that the estimated parameters of the openness terms change little when economic 
institutions is excluded.  The only exception is Model 5 for which we use specification 5(b), notwithstanding the statistical 
significance of economic institutions in 5(a).    
  19The derivatives at the minimum values of openness allow us to comment on the strict version of 
RZ. The summary statistics also allow us to make inferences about the sum of the two derivatives at 
various points in the distribution, which, as explained in Section 3, sheds light on the loose version 
of RZ.  In order to provide more evidence on the latter, we also calculate the sum of the two 
derivatives for each country-year (not reported in the tables).   
At the mean level of financial openness, the derivative of our four financial development indicators 
is negative, with the exceptions of Model 6(a) and 4(a); it is worth however noting that Model 6(a) 
has insignificant coefficients for both trade and financial openness and the interaction term.   
However, when these derivatives are evaluated at the minimum level of financial openness all but 
one are positive, and in some instances (e.g. Model 1a) quite large.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, when financial openness is at its maximum value, all but one of the derivatives of the 
financial development indicators with respect to trade openness is negative.  At the mean level of 
trade openness, most of the derivatives of the financial development indicators with respect to trade 
openness are positive.  When evaluated at the minimum level of trade openness, these derivatives 
are positive without exception, with the largest ones corresponding to private credit and companies 
listed. At the other end of the spectrum, at the highest level of trade openness, all of these 
derivatives are negative with just one exception – companies listed. 
Given these summary statistics, it is clear that the loose version of RZ receives empirical support 
from the most closed economies, where it appears to hold, but receives no support from the most 
open economies in the sample. The additional calculations carried out suggest that the looser 
version of RZ holds within the sample for a relatively small number of country-years. This is 
particularly true in the case of the banking development indicators. In the case of private credit 
(Model 1a), these include Bangladesh (23 years), Cameroon (2 years), Ethiopia (9 years), Ghana (6 
years), India (all 24 years), Mexico (3 years), Nigeria (1 year), Pakistan (6 years), Paraguay (1 
year), Syria (1 year), Turkey (10 years), and Zimbabwe (5 years).  A very similar picture emerges 
for domestic credit (Model 3a) while in the case of liquid liabilities (Model 2b), the hypothesis hold 
for a wider range of country-years, which in terms of countries additionally include Algeria, 
Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Uruguay.  Interestingly, at the end of the sample in 2003, the 
hypothesis receives support only from India in the case of both credit indicators and additionally 
from Bangladesh in the case of liquid liabilities.  A similar picture emerges when using the sample 
of developed and developing economies that ends in 1996.  By that year, the sum of the two private 
  20credit derivatives remains positive only in a handful of countries (Bangladesh, India, Argentina, 
Brazil, Japan).  
In the case of the capital market indicator, however, the loose version of RZ has wider applicability 
in the samples utilized, as indicated by the summary statistics. Indeed further calculations confirm 
that even at the end of the sample backing Model 4(a) in 2003, the sum of the two derivatives is 
positive for twelve countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Peru, Turkey, Venezuela, Zimbabwe).  Using Model 8(a), this is true of twenty countries 
in 1996 – almost two thirds of the countries in that sample.    
With one exception, the marginal effects of trade and financial openness have by and large positive 
values when financial and trade openness, respectively, are at their minimum values. This is true of 
both banking system and capital market development indicators.  This contradicts the strict version 
of RZ which stipulates that trade (or financial) openness alone will not deliver financial 
development.  In the only case where the marginal effect is negative, which corresponds to the 
derivative of domestic credit with respect to trade openness - Model 7(a)  in Table 5a – the marginal 
effect does not increase with greater financial openness as would be implied by RZ.   
We conclude that the evidence from the banking development indicators is to some degree 
supportive of the loose interpretation of RZ, in that the most closed economies are likely to benefit 
from simultaneous opening of trade and capital accounts, but not supportive of the strict version.  
The evidence in favor of the loose version of RZ is much stronger when one considers the capital 
market development indicator used in this study than the banking system development indicators.  
Thus, the simultaneous openness hypothesis appears to hold more promise for the development of 
capital markets than the development of banking systems. 
Our results seem to suggest the presence of sharply diminishing returns to openness, broadly 
defined to include both trade and financial openness. The least open countries stand to benefit most 
in terms of financial development by opening up either their trade or their capital accounts and the 
effects are larger if they open both.  At the other end of the spectrum, the most open countries stand 
to benefit least from additional openness.  Indeed, further examination of the variation of the values 
of these derivatives across countries and over time suggests that the values of both derivatives have 
been steadily declining during the sample period as a result of increased openness over time.  Using 
Dataset 1 we find that by the end of the sample in 2003, all the country derivatives of private credit 
with respect to trade openness are negative.  On the other hand, the derivative of private credit with 
  21respect to financial openness in the same year remains positive for the following countries (ranked 
in descending order with values in parentheses): India (0.1019), Bangladesh (0.0753), Pakistan 
(0.0352), Niger (0.0330), Guatemala (0.0173), Venezuela (0.0098), and Zimbabwe (0.0088).  
A more promising picture emerges when examining the derivatives of our capital market indicator 
in Dataset 2, with both remaining positive at the end of the sample period for almost half of the 
countries in the sample, even though both have been declining over time. Specifically, the 
derivative of the number of listed companies with respect to trade openness in 2003 remains 
positive in the case of the following ten countries (ranked in descending order with values in 
parentheses):  Bangladesh  (0.1181), India   (0.1040), Zimbabwe (0.0657), Mexico  (0.0542), 
Pakistan   (0.0454), Korea  (0.0219), Indonesia   (0.0190), Turkey   (0.0112), Egypt  (0.0039), Peru 
(0.0034).  The derivative of the same variable with respect to financial openness in 2003 is positive 
for the following sixteen countries: India (0.1553), Bangladesh (0.1391), Peru (0.1349), Pakistan 
(0.1148), Egypt (0.1005), Venezuela (0.0994), Zimbabwe (0.0988), Uruguay (0.0902), Indonesia 
(0.0688), Mexico (0.0649), Turkey (0.0647), Chile  (0.0436), Korea  (0.0328), Morocco (0.0427), 
Nigeria (0.0040), Trinidad and Tobago  (0.0040).
27  
To conclude, the empirical distribution of the marginal effects of openness within the sample 
suggests that additional openness may be more effective in promoting capital market development 
than banking system development, with financial openness offering more scope for advancing 
financial development than trade openness. Additional trade openness is unlikely to deliver any 
stimulus to banking sector development in any country but may well help to boost the development 
of capital markets in a few countries, particularly those that do not have very open capital accounts, 
such as Bangladesh, India, Mexico, Zimbabwe and Pakistan.  Additional financial openness is 
likely to provide a stimulus to banking sector development in a similar small group of countries but 
may impact positively on capital market development in a much wider range of countries. 
Economic Institutions and Financial Development 
The evidence on Hypothesis II is also mixed.  In Table 2 economic institutions enter significantly 
with a fairly large positive coefficient in both the private and domestic credit equations alongside 
                                                 
27 The discussion focuses on Datasets 1 and 2, which are more recent and therefore more relevant for policy analysis.  
However, similar results are obtained using Datasets 3 and 4.  Using Dataset 3, the derivative of private credit with 
respect to trade openness is also negative at the end of the sample (1996) in all countries, but is positive with respect to 
financial openness for all but two countries. Using Dataset 4, we find that the derivative of the number of listed 
companies at the end of the sample (1996) with respect to financial openness is positive for all but one country while 
with respect to trade openness it is positive for just five countries (India, Argentina, Brazil, Japan and US). 
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is not significant in both the liquid liabilities and listed companies equations. In Table 3, economic 
institutions enter significantly and with a positive coefficient in all three banking development 
equations.  However, they enter with a negative and significant coefficient in the listed companies 
equation, which clearly contradicts this Hypothesis.  The latter may of course reflect the fact that 
the sample includes several developed economies for which the variable may be acting like a proxy 
for ‘red tape’ or the bureaucratic cost of establishing new companies.     
Improvements in economic institutions are likely to have a large impact in countries with low 
institutional scores.  This alternative channel of banking sector development may be particularly 
useful to low income countries
28   that are already open, which stand to benefit little in terms of 
additional openness. Examples of such countries in our datasets include Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo and Zambia.   If, for instance, Togo were to 
increase its institutions score of 18.8 in 2003 to the sample mean for that year (33.1) – an increase 
of just under two standard deviations - then its ratio of private credit to GDP is predicted to increase 
by around 16 percent.   
 
6.  Concluding Remarks  
The results presented in this paper suggest that openness, as well as economic institutions, are 
statistically important determinants of the variation in financial development across countries and 
over time since the 1980s.  Our findings, which are obtained utilising four different data sets, are 
robust to the measurement of financial development, the indicator of financial openness utilised and 
alternative estimation procedures and methods.   
We find mixed evidence on RZ.  While the simultaneous opening of both trade and capital accounts 
may have a large positive impact on financial development in economies that are relatively closed, 
it does not appear to be a necessary condition for financial development to take place.  This finding 
may be good news for policy makers facing political constraints that prevent simultaneous opening 
of both trade and capital accounts.  An added bonus for policy makers is that economic institutions 
appear to have an independent influence on banking sector development – but not capital market 
development - over and above that of trade and financial openness.  
                                                 
28 Using the World Bank classification of low income countries. 
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economies by developing their financial systems. There is good news for policy makers in low 
income countries that are relatively closed, since opening up their trade and/or capital accounts may 
provide an effective stimulus to financial development. In our developing country data set prime 
examples of such countries are Bangladesh, Ghana, India and Pakistan. At the other end of the 
spectrum, low income countries that are already very open, such as Malawi, Senegal, Togo and 
Zambia, need to focus on improving their institutional infrastructure in order to grow their financial 
systems.     
The empirical distribution of the marginal effects of openness within the sample suggests that 
additional openness may be more effective in promoting capital market development than banking 
system development, while financial openness offers greater scope for advancing financial 
development than trade openness.  This analysis also suggests that additional trade openness is 
unlikely to deliver any stimulus to banking sector development in any country but may well help to 
boost the development of capital markets in a few countries, particularly those that do not have very 
open capital accounts, such as Bangladesh, India, Mexico, Zimbabwe and Pakistan.  Additional 
financial openness is likely to provide a stimulus to banking sector development in a similar small 
group of countries but may impact positively on capital market development in a much wider range 
of countries. 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper confirms the quantitative importance of the 
mechanisms of financial development that have been highlighted by recent literature that 
emphasises political economy factors.  However, it also suggests that these mechanisms are not 
working in exactly the same ways envisaged by this literature, suggesting that more nuanced 
explanations may be needed. This may to some extent reflect the lack of formal modelling that is 
typical of this literature, which inevitably results in broad brush conclusions that do not provide 
very clear predictions for empirical work.  Such modelling is needed not only to guide future 
empirical work in the area but also to deepen our understanding of the political economy 
mechanisms that shape financial and economic development.   
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  26Table 1a: Summary of Data Set 1 





















1.0000            
Liquid 
liabilities 
0.7597 1.0000           
Domestic 
credit 
0.8010 0.8386  1.0000         
Real GDP 
per capita 
0.3375 0.2051  0.1783  1.0000       
Trade 
openness 
0.5162 0.5072  0.4165  0.1746  1.0000     
Financial 
globalization  
0.0913 0.2013  0.1582  0.0320  0.4884  1.0000   
Institutional 
Quality 
0.3909 0.3853  0.2906  0.4183  0.3653  0.2090  1.0000 
 
         
   







Deviation  deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Private credit  WDI   % of GDP  31.33  24.80  21.99  11.93  1.54  165.72 
Liquid liabilities  WDI  % of GDP  41.40  24.64  22.47  10.66  3.80  141.93 
Domestic credit  WDI  % of GDP  47.24  27.71  23.92  14.44  0.60  164.09 
Real GDP per capita  WDI  US Dollars at 2000 prices   1800.00  1856.10  1791.86  554.70  74.74  12235.67 
Trade openness  WDI  % of GDP  63.62  27.09  23.89  13.28  6.32  209.49 




% of GDP  111.28  54.02  41.18  35.50  7.35  378.48 
Institutional Quality  ICRG  Sum of corruption, rule of 
law, bureaucratic quality, 
government repudiation of 
contracts, risk of 
expropriation (each scaled 
1 to 10).  
27.22 8.43  5.65  6.32  8  45 
Countries 
N=42 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Niger, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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1.0000        
Real GDP 
per capita 
0.3648 1.0000      
Trade 
openness 
0.6418 0.1018 1.0000    
Financial 
globalization  
0.4793 0.0683 0.6715 1.0000   
Institutional 
Quality 



















WDI  % of (million) population  9.48  8.70 8.58 2.31 0.14 35.96 
Real GDP per capita  WDI  US Dollars at 2000 prices    2524.49  2191.58 2198.38 426.55  250.07  10122.0
7 








% of GDP  109.06  49.97  44.88  23.90  24.75  299.34 
Institutional Quality  ICRG  Sum of: corruption, rule of law, 
bureaucratic quality, government 
repudiation of contracts, risk of 
expropriation (each scaled 1 to 
10). 
31.20  6.96 4.54 5.36 10.33  45 
Countries 
N=21 
Bangladesh, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Thailand, Trinidad &Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
  28Table 1c: Summary of Data Set 3 
Annual data: 1980-1996 Observations = 544 
 
*The number of countries for Liquid Liabilities is 30 (due to missing data for France and UK) and 31 for Domestic Credit (Argentina 




















1.0000            
Liquid 
liabilities 
-- 1.0000           
Domestic 
credit 
0.8424 --  1.0000         
Real GDP 
per capita 
0.7577 0.6300  0.6967  1.0000       
Trade 
openness 
0.1298 0.2704  0.1249  -0.1243  1.0000     
Financial 
liberalization  
0.5978 0.3249  0.3513  0.5802  0.2213  1.0000   
Institutional 
Quality 

















Deviation  deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Private credit  WDI   % of GDP  51.33  38.81  36.15  15.42  0.96  184.65 
Liquid liabilities  WDI  % of GDP  51.78     31.94     30.99  9.48  9.84      199.88 
Domestic credit  WDI  % of GDP  70.19  44.58     41.50  17.81     8.35  257.60 
Real GDP per capita  WDI  US Dollars at 2000 prices    7325.42  8447.34 8479.72 1253.91 181.01  36650.89 
Trade openness  WDI  % of GDP  46.82  24.94  23.53  9.20  6.32  192.11 




Integer values from 0 to 18 
(1 added to  take logs) 
9.36 5.49    4.57  3.15  1  19 
Institutional Quality  ICRG  Sum of corruption, rule of 
law, bureaucratic quality, 
government repudiation of 
contracts, risk of 
expropriation (each scaled 1 
to 10).  
30.98 10.51  9.49  4.79  10  50 
Countries* 
N=32 
Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh,  Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,  New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
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Real GDP 
per capita 
0.5093 1.0000      
Trade 
openness 
-0.2845 -0.1879 1.0000     
Financial 
liberalization  
0.2109 0.6004 0.1784 1.0000   
Institutional 
Quality 






















Deviation  deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Number of (domestic) 
listed companies 
WDI  % of (million) population  813.96     
 
1429.59 1419.997  292.192 24  8479 
Real GDP per capita  WDI  US Dollars at 2000 prices   8158.50  9201.26  9315.42  619.24  263.54  36650.89 
Trade openness  WDI  % of GDP  49.19  27.40  27.04  6.39  13.24  192.11 




Integer values from 0 to 18 
(1 added to  take logs) 
11.51 4.75  4.26  2.23  1  19 
Institutional Quality  ICRG  Sum of: corruption, rule of 
law, bureaucratic quality, 
government repudiation of 
contracts, risk of 
expropriation (each scaled 1 
to 10). 
33.45     9.46  8.56  4.28  10.33           50  
Countries 
N=31 
Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh,  Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,  New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
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Table 2: Determinants of Financial Development in Developing or Emerging Economies 
 
 
  Model 1 
 









Number of Listed 
companies 
 










































































































































































 Number of years (T) 




















































































































1.  All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation.  A maximum of two lags of the dependent variable are 
used as instruments.  All regressors are lagged by one year.   
2.  Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
3.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
4.  Significant time dummies are included in each model and are not shown to save space. 
 




  Model 5 
 









Number of Listed 
companies 
 
Specification ref   5(a) 5(b) 6(a) 6(b) 7(a) 7(b)  8(a)  8(b) 




























































































































































 Number of years (T) 




















































































































1.  All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation.  A maximum of two lags of the dependent variable 
are used as instruments. All regressors are lagged by one year. 
2.  Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
3.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
4.  Significant time dummies are included in each model and are not shown to save space. 
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Table 4: Robustness Checks Using Non-overlapping 5-year Average Data  
 
  Model 9 
 
Model 10  Model 11 
























































































































 Number of periods (T) 

































2 : Within 
       













































1.  Models 9 and 11 are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel GMM estimation.  Model 10 is estimated using the fixed effects 
(within) estimator with robust standard errors.  In all models GDP is lagged by one period.  
2.  Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
3.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
4.  Time dummies are included in each model and are not shown to save space. 
 
  33Table 5a: Marginal Effects of Trade Openness   
Financial development indicator  
(Specification ref) 
 
Evaluated at  






Private credit (1a)  -0.2295  0.3609 -0.5378 
Private credit (5b)  -0.0760  0.1269  -0.1766 
Liquid Liabilities (2b)  -0.0146  0.2008  -0.1271 




Domestic Credit (3a)  -0.0371   0.1555  -0.1377 
Domestic Credit (7a)  -0.1107  -0.0587  -0.1365 
Number of Companies Listed (4a)  0.0269 0.2166  -0.1286 
Number of Companies Listed (8a)  -0.0572  0.0952  -0.2508 
 
Table 5b: Marginal Effects of Financial Openness   
Financial development indicator  
(Specification ref) 
 
Evaluated at  






Private credit (1a)  -0.0468 0.4606  -0.3376 
Private credit (5b)   0.0779  0.2709  -0.0813 
Liquid Liabilities (2b)  -0.0603 0.1248  -0.1664 
Liquid Liabilities (6a)   0.0355
*  0.0340
*   0.0368
*
Domestic Credit (3a)  -0.0528  0.1128  -0.1477 
Domestic Credit (7a)  0.0387  0.0888  -0.0013 
Number of Companies Listed (4a)  0.0701  0.2656  -0.1169 
Number of Companies Listed (8a)  0.1412  0.4394   0.0584 
 
*Statistically insignificant coefficients. 
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